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Abstract 
   This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, 
Auditing, and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
   There are numerous papers concerning the biggest economies inside the world, but 
not many about small stock markets which include the Greek, too. The Greek 
ownership structure is highly based on family–controlled. So the major shareholder 
may alienate the minority shareholders. This fact has an enormous impact on earnings 
quality and in performance, too. 
   The relation between founding family and managerial ownership with earnings 
quality is investigated in this research, based on earning management. Literature that 
exists has documented that family ownership structure could reduce the influence to 
reported income, however, it could provide motivations to control earnings. Taking a 
sample of listed firms in Greece inside the period of six years, between 2011 and 2016, 
the primary goal of this study, is to find out, if Greek companies with family and 
managerial ownership structure influence earnings quality, that’s measured by two 
variables (family and managerial ownership) using the discretionary accruals method. 
In particular, our findings show that earnings management represented by the 
discretionary accruals are negatively associated with family ownership, while the 
association between managerial ownership and abnormal accruals is positive. In 
addition, the outcome also gives a U-shape relation among family ownership and 
discretionary accruals. 
  
Keywords: (Earnings management, Family Ownership, Managerial Ownership, 
Discretionary accruals, U-shape relation) 
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1. Introduction 
So far, most corporations around the world are family-owned groups and the 
most crucial feature of Earth is the asymmetry of data among management and 
shareholders. It is also an interesting ownership structure, where “founding-families 
represent a unique class of shareholders that hold poorly diversified portfolios, are 
long-term investors (multiple generations), and often control senior management 
positions” (Anderson and Reeb [2003a, p.1304]). 
The most important followed numbers a company publishes are accountings 
earnings. Generally, the meaning of earning quality, based on accounting is the 
capacity of reported income to have the future earning of the company being 
predicted. It is a valuation criterion to find how repeatable, controllable and bankable 
the revenue of the firm, including other factors, is and has variously been described as 
the level to which profit replicate underlying economic consequences, are higher 
estimations of cash flows or are of cash flows, or are probable. 
 There are three elementary causes why management influences financial 
statements. First, in lots of cases, the payment of corporate executives is 
straightforwardly tied to the financial performance of the firm. Second, it is 
moderately not difficult to control corporate financial statements as the Financial 
Accounting Standards offers a wide range of latitude in the accounting and are a wide 
range of latitude in the accounting necessities and are easily accessible to corporate 
management. The IFRS requirements manage a large amount of flexibility, making 
cleaner for corporate management to change the financial results in a way that would 
be profitable for them. Third, it may be doubtful that financial control will be caught by 
stockholders thanks to the association of the independent auditor and the corporate 
client. As a result, the auditors could be enticed to break the accounting rules 
(receiving a huge amount of money) to report the financial results the financial results 
of the firm in a way that would satisfy their customer. 
Nevertheless, there are two common methods to control financial results. We 
begin with the approach, which raises current period earnings on the income 
statement by unnaturally increasing the sales of the exact period or by decreasing the 
cost of the period. This study gives a better image of the financial condition of the 
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company from the real appearance, in order to catch the expectations. Additionally, 
about the second approach, which is exactly the opposite, refers to a decrease in the 
sales or an increase in the costs with the result of increasing the current period 
earnings. 
Family ownership could use two methods for manipulating the financial results: 
the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect. The first one inspires the financial 
statements providers (companies) to deviously manage revenues. The board of 
directors is been most of the times held by family members. Consequently, relatives, 
with the motivation, have also and the chance to control accounting earnings for 
private gains. Additionally, in the entrenchment case, we expect that family ownership 
is connected with lower earning quality. On the other hand, with the alignment case, 
earnings quality are very high because of the reporting of faithful earnings. It is said 
that companies have better and effective monitoring when we found family ownership 
(Shleifer and Vishny [1997]). Par example, accordingly Weber et al. [2003], family firms 
have the capacity to decide more rapid and prefer to generate longstanding a loyal 
relationship with the employees. Although in the alignment case companies with 
family ownership wants to state earning with excellent quality, if they believe that 
family ownership helps corporate governance, it might lessen the interest for excellent 
financial reports by contracting parties. General, the result of these two theories is 
that the effect of family ownership in relation to the earnings quality is an empirical 
matter. 
As we said before, here, in our study we look into the matter between family 
and managerial ownership with the quality of financial statements in Greek firms. For 
this purpose, using as a tool for calculating earnings management, the method of 
discretionary accruals, we take into account two main variables (family and managerial 
ownership). From the sample that we take (81 listed firms in Greece between the 
years 2011-2016), we come to the result that both family and managerial ownership 
influence management incentives in having their reported earnings manipulated. For 
that reason, this study reports that in Greece the earnings management, which 
dominates in this country, is affected by the ownership structure. Furthermore, we 
have proofs that there is a U-shape relation between family ownership and earnings 
quality.  
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Is detected that the 20 bigger US companies have 80% no controlling 
shareholder. In contrast, the percentage of the family ownership of the 20 largest 
firms in Greece is 65%, while the government controls the percentage of and the last 
small percentage of 5% is owned by different ownership (La Porta et al. (1999). 
Moreover, using CMC (2001a, 2001b), the spreading of companies’ shares in Greece, 
maybe 47% the points assuming the shareholders who own at minimun 5% of shares. 
This discovering give confirmation that the company’s administration is controlled by 
some shareholders. They additionally demonstrate that firms with medium- and small-
sized firms, in Greece, are usually owned by families, who have the ownership and the 
controlled, too. 
Finally, in our opinion, there is no research in Greece that investigates the case 
of correlation between family ownership structure and earning management. This 
state will result in the increase of knowledge concerning that phenomenon. First, they 
could supply investors with useful information about decisions taking about 
investment in any family-owned company. Additionally, stakeholders as handlers of 
financial statements may think about this research interesting, regarding earnings 
management, and helps them on financial decisions.  
The organization of the paper is organized: Firstly, the following chapter is 
about the related literature and the hypothesis development. Secondly, in the third 
chapter we see the research design, and after that, the main results are exhibited in 
the fourth chapter. Finally, in the fifth chapter, the research is finished up.         
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2. The Hypothesis and the Literature Review 
In this stage, we represent the literature review, which is the theories from 
famous papers concerning the ownership. In addition, we present our hypotheses. 
 2.1. Theoretical development 
Agency theory says that division of family ownership and control, induce a 
dissimilarity in looking for managerial gain as opposed to owners’ gains (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). On the other hand, the large shareholders have the motivations to 
achieve their own goals at the cost of other investors, (Vishy and Shleifer [1997]). 
Regarding fact, a combination of ownership and manipulation generates 
disagreements to the firm (Vishy, Morck, and Shleifer [1988] and Jensen and Fama 
[1983]). Therefore, right decisions methods for corporate governance has the 
possibility of reducing earnings manipulation as they employ an efficient method for 
controlling the management regarding the procedure of financial statement. Amongst 
the earnings quality and the family ownership, there is an association which matches 
exactly with the agency theory, in which the members of the controlling family steal 
prosperity from other investors by manipulating the reported earnings (Jensen 1976). 
Latest papers, examining the association amongst the different types of ownership and 
the earnings quality. Regarding Dechow (2002), there is a correlation amongst 
ownership types and earnings quality, and as a result with the earnings management 
too, because without earnings management, the earnings are in a high level. For 
example, consisting with Wong and Fan (2002), the decisions are taken from the 
managers and the earnings quality, are influenced from the focus on different 
ownership, which have as a result the irregularity of information amongst shareholders 
and managers. Regarding Cheng and Warfiels (2005) and Warfield (1995), in contrast 
with the family ownership, there is a negative and a positive influence from the 
managerial ownership on earnings quality.  
Finally, the demand and the supply of reported earnings are influenced by 
family ownership in two methods: the approach of alignment and the approach of 
entrenchment (Wang [2006]).   
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2.2. The entrenchment method besides family ownership 
 In all over the world, even in Greece, in family-owned companies, the family 
members represent a huge part on the BoB (Board of Directors), as well as, many of 
them have the positions of CEOs and chairmen. Therefore, the corporate governance 
of this kind of firms is weak because of the ineffective monitoring. The entrenchment 
approach refers to the argument that the more the ownership is concentrated, the 
more controlling shareholders would take wealth from other investors to achieve their 
own gains (Shleifer, Vishny and Morck 1988, Fama and Jensen 1983, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Also, the entrenchment effect explains the fact that family members 
might be pushed to change earnings for their private benefits. That results in lower 
quality earnings. Furthermore, the entrenchment effect has, as a result, the irregularity 
of information amongst shareholders and managers. There are some facts that 
member of the controlling family, steal the smaller interest, especially if Bertrand 
(2002), Kling and Gao (2008). Regarding Wong and Fan (2002), represent that when 
there are big shareholders like families there more possible to have earnings 
management. 
 Generally, driven by the market requirement, earning quality from public firms 
is higher that is from private firms. This because the market demands higher earnings 
quality from public firms. Additionally, the entrenchment approach maybe influences 
the handlers of the financial reporting for having the request for high earnings quality. 
On the other hand, this approach influence family companies to report earnings go 
higher quality for improving the contracting terms, like the limitation of the cost of 
capital. 
 
2.3. The alignment approach and family ownership 
 However, according to Wang (2005), the alignment approach which is aligned 
in a good way because the family members own a huge amount of shares. 
Consequently, according to the alignment effect, there no existence for the possibility 
that family members will expropriate wealth from other investors having the earnings 
manipulated. According to Anderson and Reeb (2003), family members tend to 
monitor managers or employees more than a non-family member of the company 
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would do. This due to the strong link between the family financial wealth and the firm 
value. Furthermore, the companies operation would be influenced negatively by the 
earnings management because usually earnings management is adjusted in short-
term. Therefore, the application of a long-term strategy, and reputation protection, 
too, reduce the risk of earnings manipulation to meet short-term financial goals. In 
another way, the strong controlling mechanisms push family members to improve the 
accounting communication with the other shareholders and creditors. This may have 
as consequence the reduction of the cost of debt (Anderson, and Reeb 2003). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) underline that, in agreement with the alignment effect, the 
performance of the family companies is way better than the non-family companies’ 
performance. This can be explained by the sturdier corporate governance of the family 
companies and the inferior cost of debt. 
 As argued above, the alignment effect predicts that family ownership is 
associated with stronger corporate governance. The stronger corporate governance, in 
turn, mitigates managers’ opportunism in managing reported earnings (Klein [2002]). 
In turn, founding family firms are expected to report earnings of higher quality. On the 
other hand, the findings of Wu [2003] may imply that family firms report earnings of 
lower quality because their incentives to report high-quality earnings are lower than 
those of nonfamily firms Generally, many investigations like Ali (2007), Bona-
Sanchez (2011), Wang (2006) and Dadalt (2009), have presented that in evaluation 
with nonfamily companies, family-owned firms are extremely related with a low 
probability of earnings management 
In the study of Leuz (2003) which is a research amongst 31 countries, Greece is 
inside the ones who have earnings management with the highest level. Furthermore, 
as mentioned before, the majority of Greek firms are family-controlled (La Porta 1999).  
The association amongst family ownership and earnings quality is generated an 
important request. Therefore, regarding the entrenchment approach, this study shows 
a positive relationship amongst family ownership and earnings management, as we see 
below: 
 
H1 (Hypothesis): The association of family ownership and earnings quality. 
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2.4. Earnings Quality and Managerial ownership 
 Indicated by agency theory that the share of equity stakes between managers 
and shareholders assist to the relationship amongst their interests and the interest of 
alignment effect indicated by Meckling and Jensen 1976). Thus, managerial ownership 
is a tool which compels these performances by managers and therefore, the range that 
they control earnings which is very negative for the insider ownership. Many 
economists like Warfield (1995), Ebrahim (2007), Klein (2002), Ali (2008) and 
Banderlipe (2009), shows that managerial ownership does not influence the behavior 
of managers for changing the earnings of this companies. Managerial ownership is 
relative to earnings quality of low levels. 
Regarding the entrenchment approach of management, the big investors are 
managers and they have an extreme power to achieve their personal goals without to 
be afraid of punishment (Jensen and Fama 1983, Eeisbach 1988). In this vein, according 
to studies like Cheng and Warfield (2005), Guirdy (1999) and Hearly (1985), managers 
control the earnings to increase their personal fortune. Therefore, for improving 
managers their earnings and their stocks’ value they use as a tool the discretionary 
accruals, which is an influence from the managerial ownership. Then papers like Mitani 
2010 and Al-Fayoumi 2010, have stated that the higher earnings management is 
related to higher managerial ownership. 
As we have seen before, it is usual in managerial ownership to be related to 
family ownership and the managers of these companies which are in most cases family 
member owned the majority of shares. It is expected a positive relationship amongst 
managerial ownership and earnings management. So, our H 2 is: 
 
H2 (Hypothesis 2): Positive relation amongst earnings management and managerial 
ownership. 
2.5. U-shape relation 
 Generally, epidemiology, psychology, and economics are the science where we 
can find in the U-shape relation. The U-shaped curve commonly is related to the 
nonlinear relationship between two variables, specifically, a dependent and an 
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independent variable. Because many analytic methods assume an underlying linear 
relationship, systematic deviation from linearity can lead to bias in estimation. As for 
our own case, U-shape relation is not the starting post for this kind of investigation, 
nevertheless, according to Reeb and Anderson (2003), we found that amongst 
founding family ownership and companies’ performance there is a U-shape relation. 
Consequently, we add up the square of founding family ownership (FAM) 2 to model 2, 
which we will see later and we investigate if there is a U–shaped relation amongst 
family ownership and earnings quality. 
 
H3 (Hypothesis 3): Existence of U-shape association amongst family ownership and 
firm performance. 
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3. Research Layout 
At the start of this chapter, we describe how we came into this sample. 
3.1. Collection of Data and the Sample 
 The first sample initial sample contains the whole firms that are listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Athens (ASE) the latest years (n=234). On the grounds that we are 
inspecting the six-year period 2011 – 2016, the ultimate sample has been created like 
this: 
 Companies that are appeared as finance-related companies (containing real 
estate companies, n=25) are rejected. In accordance to present literature, there would 
be a problem with the calculations of discretionary accruals because this type of 
companies is exposed to special disclosure necessities. Additionally, are also rejected 
firms that they are in temporary postponement in ASE (n=35). Moreover, from the 
sample, we have also rejected the companies who are under supervision, concerning 
their shares trading (n=40). Then, we have rejected too companies with lacking data 
which are vital for our regressions (n=41). Finally, from the rest firms are excluded 
those without family ownership (n=12). Therefore, 81 non-financial firms and later 324 
observations overall, synthesize our final sample. The sample collection standards for 
this research are shown below in Table 1. 
 Amadeus Database and Annual Reports of the firms’ help to finding our data 
regarding our needed variables. Also, the ASEs’ website (www.helex.gr) help to take a 
piece of information about firms’ ownership structure. 
Table 1: Sample Collection Standards 
Standard Quantity of companies  
Firms listed in ASE 234  
Less  
Financial Companies (25)  
Firms under supervision (35)  
Firms with lack of data (40)  
Companies with missing data  (41)  
Without family ownership (12) 
Final test sample   81 
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3.2. Measurement of family ownership and other variables 
 Continuing with our research layout chapter, the evaluation of our initials and 
secondary variables is defined. In the end, we show our Empirical models. 
3.2.1. Measuring the Structures of Family and Managerial Ownership 
At first, the definition of the family ownership (FAMILY) is the calculation of the 
percentage of the firms’ stocks which are owned by family members ( Lang and Faccio 
[2002]). Consistent with La Porta et al. (1999), every firm that we have selected are 
family companies and are managed by the most important shareholder who owned as 
a minimum percentage of 10 of voting rights or equity shares, hence to certify that 
every company is controlling by a family. Additionally, the meaning of managerial 
ownership (MANAGER) is the percentage of companies’ shares possessed by the 
managers. Here, it is very important to state that it is very common in family 
companies, the members of the monitoring family and the managers of an 
organization (CFO, CEO) would be the same persons. 
3.2.2. U-shape relation 
It is said that exist a U-shape relation amongst family ownership and earning 
management (Anderson and Reeb [2003]). We add the square in family ownership 
variable (FAMILYt)2  in the model 2, so being able to examine if there is a U-shape 
relation amongst the earnings quality and family ownership. 
3.2.3. Measuring Earnings Management 
 Based on the excellent previous studies of De Fond and Subramanyam (1998) 
and Kothari (2005) on earnings management, as proxies for earnings quality, we use 
calculations of discretionary accruals. In a manner of that, as our initial proxy for 
earnings management, we take the discretionary accruals. Nevertheless,  recently Ball 
claim that the conservative linear model for accruals does not succeed to agree with 
the nonlinearity of the accruals procedure. As a result, the reformed model by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), adopted from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) is very useful for 
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measure abnormal accruals. Particularly is the following model for the estimation of 
abnormal accruals: 
 
ACCt = α0 + α1CFt + α2CFt-1 + α3CFt+1 + α4DCFt + α5DCFt ∗ CFt + et   (1) 
where: 
ACCt = total accruals at year t, total accruals are earning before extraordinary items 
minus operating cash flows. 
CFt = operating cash flows at year t, scaled by average total assets. 
CFt −1 = operating cash flows at year t-1, scaled by average total assets. 
CFt +1 = operating cash flows at year t+1, scaled by average total assets. 
DCFt = dummy variable, 1 if the change in cash flow at year t is less than zero (CFt-CFt-
1<0) and 0 otherwise. 
et = error term. 
The variable, DFt ∗ CFt, is the calculation for accounting losses. It is worth mentioning 
that it is possible to be negative or positive the number of the variable discretionary 
accruals (DACCR), that is one we use in this study, because of the decreasing or 
increasing of income in accruals relating to earnings management. The residual from 
the non-linear OLS  regression in the model (1) is the DACCR variables’ value in the 
followings models. 
3.2.4. Empirical Model 
We examine the association amongst family and managerial ownership and 
earning management via using the next OlS regressions: 
 
DACCt=β0+β1FAMILYt+β2MANAGERt+β3ASSETSt+β4ROAt+β5LEVt+β6DSt 
              +β7LOSSt+β8BIG4+β9PPEt+e t (2) 
 
DACCt=β0+β1FAMILYt+β2FAMILYt2β3MANAGERt+β4ASSETSt+β5ROAt+β6
LEVt+β7DSt+β8LOSSt+β9BIG4+β10PPEt+e t (3) 
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Where, 
DACCt = value (absolute) of abnormal accruals at year t. 
FAMILYt = proportion of founding family ownership at year t. 
FAMILYt2 = square of the proportion of founding family ownership at year t. 
MANAGERt = insider ownership, calculated via the proportion of total common 
equity owned by managers. 
ROAt = the net income at year t divided by average total assets at year t. 
LEVt = firms’ leverage at year t, calculated via total liabilities divided by total assets. 
ASSETSt= total assets at year t. 
DSt = the difference in sales from year t-1 to t.        
LOSSt = is a dummy variable: 0 if net income > 0, 1 otherwise.  
BIG4 = is a dummy variable: 0 if the auditor is not from the BIG4 firms, 1 otherwise. 
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment. 
et = error term. 
β0 = constant. 
β1-β10 = coefficients. 
3.2.5. Controls Variables  
Consisting of Cohen (2008), firms maybe use further the method of 
discretionary accruals with the purpose of manipulating their stated earnings of the 
year. Consequently, we comprised as a dependent variable a number for the earnings 
management based on accruals method (DACCR) in the OLS regression (Cohen [2008] 
and Kim [2012]).   
Assumed as main control variable the Family and the Managerial ownership, is not the 
only factor affecting discretionary accruals, there are many others control variables 
that we could present thus to investigate separately different motivations which could 
have an impact on the accounting decisions of the managers.  
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The ratio return on assets shows the profitability of a company. Previous 
studies of Chen (2007) support that companies with Prior studies suggested that firms 
are involved with earning management when they have lower profitability. Actually, 
different studies showed that companies have lower earning management when the 
profitability is high (Klein 2002 and Bedard 2004). So, in this study, we use as one of 
the control variables the ROA which is calculated by net income to total assets.  
The model also contains the ratio of leverage to measure a firms’ debt limits, 
meanwhile when managers are nearby to failure as for example debt restraints, are 
more probable to manipulate accounting results. According to debt hypothesis, when 
firms are close to default their debts contracts, then it is expected that the companies’ 
managers would utilize antagonistic techniques for earnings management to avoid the 
failure (Bedard (2004) and Zimmerman and Watts (1986) Corresponding with Chung 
(2002) and Yang (2008), we notice a negative relationship amongst earnings 
management and leverage ratio. The calculation of long-term debt to total assets, 
express the LEV control variable. 
The PPE and ASSETS variables are employed to appreciate the size of every firm 
because as stated by the latest studies, it is not probable to have family ownership in 
bigger companies. 
The difference in sales is a variable that tests the growth opportunity. 
According to Wang (2006), family ownership firms have greater growth in sales. 
Loss dummy variable, which helps to investigate the risk for bankruptcy. Family 
companies are unlikely to have a loss in their financial statements (Wang 2006). 
Conclusively, regarding Big 4 auditor firms, is enough possible to find and 
report irregularities and material errors in companies’ financial statements (Chi 
[2011]). Furthermore, the high level of flexibility in the account is associated with bad 
quality of the audit. Consequently, we use the variable BIG4, which is a dummy, to 
measure the quality of audit in earnings management. 
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4. Multivariate Findings 
In this chapter, we represent the finals results of our research (including descriptive 
data, the outcome of the regressions and correlations) and after that, we analyze the 
results. 
4.1. Results of the Models 
At first of the empirical analysis, here in Table 2, are shown the descriptive statistics of 
the variables. 
Table 2: Outcome of the descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean               Median  Maximum  Minimum   Std. Dev. 
DACCR               0.004                0.361                   2.890    -0.010    0.0249 
FAMILY              0.569                0.607                   0.956      0.000     0.200 
MANAGER        0.478                0.496                   0.956      0.000     0.226 
FAMILY2            0.364                  0.369                    0.914      0.000     0.218 
LEV               0.196                0.164         1.265     -0.157     0.172 
ROA              -0.023               -0.018                   0.260     -0.359     0.074 
ASSETS           263000000        74686970  3270000000  3587500   563000000 
Dummies variables 
BIG4                0.141                 0.000                    1.000       0.000     0.349                   
LOSS              0.613                 1.000                   1.000       0.000     0.487 
Number of observations: 324 
Notes: Period: 2011-2016. DACCR, discretionary accruals’ value. FAMILY, family ownership. MANAGER, insider 
ownership, calculated via the proportion of total common equity owned by managers. FAMILY2, squared family 
ownership. LEV, firms’ leverage at year t, calculated via total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA, the net income 
at year t divided by average total assets at year t. ASSETS, total assets at year t. BIG4 is a dummy variable: 0 if the 
auditor is not from the BIG4 firms, 1 otherwise. LOSS is a dummy variable: 0 if net income > 0, 1 otherwise. 
 
Table 2 displays that the means of the DACCR (dependent variable) is very near 
to 0 and the next chapter would represent the interpretation. The variables FAM and 
MANAGER have standard deviation (mean) 0.57 (0.20) and 0.48 (0.23), respectively. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation values (mean) of the variables ASSETS, BIG4, LEV 
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and LOSS has the value 563000000 (263000000), 0.35 (0.14) , 0.18 (0.2) and 0.48 
(0.61), respectively. 
The next stage of this analysis contains the calculation of the correlation 
coefficients among the variables with the help of the SPSS software. According to 
Kolmogorov- Smirnov, as we used the non-parametric test of normality, we decide to 
pick the Pearson correlation coefficient and we come to the result which shows the 
typical distribution of the variables. Here, in table 3, we represent our results. 
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 ASSETS DS MANAGER LEV FAM FAM_2 PPE ROA DACCR 
ASSETS 1.000         
DS -0.127*** 1.000        
MANAGER -0.201*** -0.002 1.000       
LEV  0.124** -0.069 -0.060 1.000      
FAM -0.302***  0.021 0.629***  0.070 1.000     
FAM_2 -0.280***  0.025 0.606***  0.071 0.986*** 1.000    
PPE 0.922*** -0.102*** -0.170*** 0.176*** -0.255*** -0.230*** 1.000   
ROA 0.214*** -0.023  0.028 -0.150 -0.063 -0.046 0.123*** 1.000  
DACCR 0.191***  0.034  0.051 -0.187***  -0.025  0.024 0.397*** 0.377*** 1.000 
 
 
Notes: Period: 2011-2016. DACCR, discretionary accruals’ value. FAMILY, family ownership. MANAGER, insider 
ownership, calculated via the proportion of total common equity owned by managers. FAMILY2, squared family 
ownership. LEV, firms’ leverage at year t, calculated via total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA, the net income 
at year t divided by average total assets at year t. ASSETS, total assets at year t. BIG4 is a dummy variable: 0 if the 
auditor is not from the BIG4 firms, 1 otherwise. LOSS is a dummy variable: 0 if net income > 0, 1 otherwise. 
***, **, * show the significance at 0,01, 0,05 and 0,10 level, respectively. 
 
 According to Table 3, we observe that amongst the descriptive leading 
variables (FAMILY, MANAGER, FAMILY2), the correlation coefficient is at a level of 5% 
statistically significant. Especially, amongst FAMILY and MANAGER variables there is 
correlation coefficient value of 0.609, which specifies that amongst these variables 
there is a middle correlation. Consequently, when the one variable is decreased 
(increased), the other would be decreased (increased) by 0.6 units. FAMILY2 and 
FAMILY variables have a positive relation, as the value of their correlation coefficient is 
corresponding to 0.98. Therefore, if the one variable has a negative (positive) change 
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by one unit, the other would be affected by 0.986 units negatively (positively). Last but 
not least, amongst the variables MANAGER and FAMILY2 the correlation coefficient has 
the value of 0.606, which indicate that amongst the two variables there is a positive 
association, too. The one variable would be decreased (increased) by 0.60 units if the 
other would be changed by one unit decreasingly (increasingly). It is not so remarkable 
the correlations amongst the independent variables and the dependent, mentioned 
before. More exactly, amongst the variables DACCR and the FAMILY, MANAGER, and 
FAMILY2 there is no a statistically significant correlation coefficient at the 5% level. This 
element, present that changing the three explanatory variables, would not affect the 
DACCR variable at a significant level. With the reason that the calculation of the 
aforesaid correlation coefficients has been done without considering the 
manipulations of the independent variables, this outcome is agreeing with results of 
the OLS regressions. Also, in Table 3 we see the variables, FAMILY, FAMILY2, 
MANAGER, PPE, and ASSETS have correlation coefficient which is at a level of 5% 
significant. More exactly, amongst the FAMILY and PPE variables there a negative 
relationship as they have their correlation coefficient equal to -0.255, while the 
coefficient amongst PPE and MANAGER has the value of -0.170, showing a relationship 
which is negative, too. It is worth mentioning that amongst the two variables, DACCR 
and ROA, we have a significant and positive correlation coefficient and as a result, a 
reduction (growth) of the one variable would produce a reduction (growth) of the 
other. Consequently, the coefficients that are measured through the OLS regression 
are certified.  
Additionally, the Table 3 indicates that amongst the variable LEV with the 
variables DACCR, ASSETS, and PPE, there is a significant correlation coefficient at 5% 
level, whilst in relation with the others it’s not. The only case, when the variable DS 
have a significant correlation coefficient, is with the variables PPE and ASSETS. Lastly, it 
is important to state that the variables PPE and ASSETS have a statistically significant 
correlation in every case, with all the other variables at the 5% level. 
In the next level of our analysis which represent the outcome of our empirical 
model. At first, the model (2), in which the main independent variable is FAMILY and 
the dependent is DACCR, is estimated. We use the OLS method (ordinary least 
squares) to calculate the coefficient in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Regression results with discretionary accruals method 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  
(p-value)  
FAMILY  -0.921388  -4.18473* 
(0.09759)  
MANAGER   0.162247 0.483578*  
(0.09290)  
ASSETS   0.004327 2.697771***  
(0.0074)  
LEV  -0.337471 -1.847038  
(0.0657)  
ROA   0.118000 4.014039 *** 
(0.0001)  
DS   0.000560 0.569565  
(0.5694)  
LOSS   0.183353 0.060270* 
(0.09520)  
BIG4  -0.106027 -0.166388  
(0.8680)  
PPE  0.127467 3.591507*** 
  (0.0004) 
C   0.686532 2.617770 *** 
(0.0093)  
Adjusted R2                          0.453495  
OBS                               324 
  
Notes: Period: 2011-2016. DACCR, discretionary accruals’ value. FAMILY, family ownership. MANAGER, insider 
ownership, calculated via the proportion of total common equity owned by managers. FAMILY2, squared family 
ownership. LEV, firms’ leverage at year t, calculated via total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA, the net income 
at year t divided by average total assets at year t. ASSETS, total assets at year t. BIG4 is a dummy variable: 0 if the 
auditor is not from the BIG4 firms, 1 otherwise. LOSS is a dummy variable: 0 if net income > 0, 1 otherwise. 
***, **, * show the significance at 0,01, 0,05 and 0,10 level, respectively. 
 
 Table 4 indicates that the coefficient of the LOSS variable is statistically 
significant, as the coefficients’ p-value is smaller than 0.10. Additionally, because of the 
positive coefficient (0.1833), the association amongst the variables, LOSS, and DACCR, 
is expected to be positive, too. Furthermore, we see that the two main variables 
(MANAGER and FAMILY) have a different coefficient. The (FAMILY) is negative and the 
(MANAGER) is positive, but both are at the level of 5% statistically significant. As a 
result, it is probable that the first will have a negative influence on the DACCR, which is 
the dependent variable, while the second, positive. So, a reduction (increase) of the 
value of the FAMILY, the first variable, would bring out an increase (reduction) to the 
DACCR (dependet variable), while the opposite to the second. Moreover, we see in the 
ROA variable a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the level of 5% and as 
a result, there would be amongst ROA and DACCR a positive association. Then, it is 
easy to understand the results that the variables, PPE, and ASSETS have positive and 
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statistically significant coefficients at the level of 5%, too. Lastly, we observe the 
coefficients of DC, LEV, and BIG4 and we understand that a probable motivation of 
their value would not have any effect on the DACCR (dependent variable) because of 
their coefficient, which at the level of 5%, are not statistically significant. In this step, it 
is important to state an example, in case of excluding these three variables from our 
regression, which are not statistically significant and reestimate the coefficients of the 
residuals variables, no one it would at the level of 5% statistically significant. It is 
assuming that amongst the whole variables exist an endogenous association. 
The last step of this research, contains the model (3), especially the calculation 
of the results. We use the OLS method (ordinary least squares) to calculate the 
coefficient in Table 4. We use, for one more time, the OLS method (ordinary least 
squares) to calculate the coefficients in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  U-shape regression 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  
(p-value)  
FAMILY -0.181244 -2.006507**  
(0.0457)  
FAM2 0.255191 1.699760** 
 . (0.0902) 
MANAGER  0.200051 0.614238*  
(0.05395)  
ASSETS   0.004336  2.713181***  
(0.0070)  
LEV  -0.332464 -1.772190***  
(0.0773)  
ROA   0.160000  3.898376*  
(0.0773)  
DS   0.000053  0.559607  
(0.5761)  
  
LOSS   0.795816  0.026153*  
(0.09792)  
BIG4  -0.127066 -0.185718  
(0.8528)  
PPE  0.012781  3.612944*** 
  (0.0004) 
C   0.109203  3.454756***  
(0.0006)  
Adjusted R2                           0.469187 
OBS                                                                                       324 
  
Notes: Period: 2011-2016. DACCR, discretionary accruals’ value. FAMILY, family ownership. MANAGER, insider 
ownership, calculated via the proportion of total common equity owned by managers. FAMILY2, squared family 
ownership. LEV, firms’ leverage at year t, calculated via total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA, the net income 
at year t divided by average total assets at year t. ASSETS, total assets at year t. BIG4 is a dummy variable: 0 if the 
auditor is not from the BIG4 firms, 1 otherwise. LOSS is a dummy variable: 0 if net income > 0, 1 otherwise. 
***, **, * show the significance at 0,01, 0,05 and 0,10 level, respectively. 
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 As indicated from the Table 5, the variable LOSS has a positive but at a level of 
5% not statistically significant coefficient, which helps us to suppose that amongst the 
variables LOSS and DACCR there is a positive association. This state is agreeing with the 
results of the previous model. Also, we see that the variables MANAGER and FAMILY2 
have a positive influence on the variable DACCR because there is at the level of 5% 
significant and positive coefficients. On the other hand, the other main variable (FAM) 
is negative but at the level of 5% significant. Then, we observe how important to our 
regressions are the variables PPE, ROA, ASSETS, and LEV. As a result, a difference in the 
values of these variables would have a significant influence on the depended variables’ 
value. Exactly, the LEV variables’ coefficient is negative, so a reduction (increase) of the 
LEV, would achieve an increase (reduction) to the DACCR. ASSETS, ROA, and PPE 
variables have a significant and positive coefficient, which represents that a negative 
(positive) change of the DACCR (dependent variable) would be caused from a negative 
(positive) alteration of these variables’ values. BIG4 dummy variable (auditing by a big4 
firm such as KPMG, E & Y, PWC, and DELOITTE) would not have an impact in the 
DACCR variables’ value because its coefficient is not at a level of 5% statistically 
significant. In the end, corresponding to the model 2 results, DS variable has a not 
significant coefficient. Therefore, a difference in the value of this variable would not 
have a significant influence on the depended variables’ value. Nevertheless, it is worth 
to say that although it is not significant the DS variable could not be rejected from the 
regression because as said before it is assuming that amongst the whole variables exist 
an endogenous association. 
4.2. Explanation of the Results 
 Table 2 shows us that the variable FAMILY has mean value 0.57, which means 
that the probable percentage of listed family-owned companies in Greece is 57%. We 
also see that the MANAGER variable has mean value 0.48, which means that the 
proportion of firms’ shares owned by CFO or CEO (managers) is 48%. It is important to 
say that both variables have very similar mean value. This fact certifies that in most 
situations family-owned companies assign the management positions in the member 
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of the family. Additionally, we observe that the LOSS variable has mean value 0.61, 
which indicates that the percentage the Greek listed companies that going through of 
economic losses is 61%. Furthermore, the BIG4 variable has a mean value equal to 
0.14, which indicates that 14% of Greek companies have as an auditor firm one from 
the Big 4 firms. In this stage, we have to state that the DACCR (dependent) variable has 
a mean value near to 0. In spite of the difficulty to find if the manager manipulates  the 
earnings or not, following the findings, the mean value is close to zero because every 
companies’ manager changes the reported earnings, either decreasing or increasing 
them. The previous findings show suggest that the majority of Greek listed companies 
are family owned. 
 Table 3 shows us that the correlations coefficients amongst the variables are 
quite interesting. Specifically, amongst the FAMILY and the MANAGER variables, there 
is a correlation coefficient 0.629 which is also statistically significant, representing that 
changing the value of the family ownership in a company by 1% will influence the value 
of the managerial ownership in a company by 0.6%. Consequently, This fact certifies 
again that in most situations family-owned companies assign the management 
positions in the member of the family. The positive correlation amongst FAMILY and 
FAMILY2 (0.98), it was expected. Moreover, the variable FAMILY2 variable is correlated 
positively correlated among the variable MANAGER, having a significant coefficient 
correlation (0.606). As, amongst the variables, FAMILY and MANAGER exist a positive 
correlation, it is expected a positive correlation amongst MANAGER and FAMILY 
variables. Additionally, amongst the variables FAMILY and DACCR, the correlation is 
negative (-0.025). On the other hand, amongst the variables MANAGER and DACCR it is 
positive (0.051). These results present that when the managerial and family ownership 
is growing by 1%, the value of the earnings management is growing and decreasing 
respectively by 0.051% and -0.025%. Finally, amongst ASSETS with DACCR and PPE with 
DACCR, we have significant and positive correlations (0.191) and (0.397), which 
indicates again the state that, depending on their size, Greek listed firms desire to 
benefit from the discretionary accounting accruals method. According to Pallant 
(2001), we mention that there is no the problem of multicollinearity because all the 
coefficients correlations are less than 0.9 thresholds. 
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 Model 2, as we see from the Table 4, indicates that the variables FAMILY and 
MANAGER have statistically significant coefficients, but  FAM is negative and 
MANAGER positive. Especially, this state makes us understand that the lower the 
values of discretionary accruals the higher the ownership of family.Consistently, the 
results of D. Wang are confirmed, and the hypothesis of the entrenchment approach 
(Hypothesis 1), too. Furthermore, based on Warfield and Cheng (2005), we see that 
the firms with a high level of managerial ownership have high earnings management 
too. This result confirms our management hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), which indicates 
that, for personal goals, managers change the reported earnings. Concerning the 
others variables, it is worth to say that PPE and ASSETS variables’ coefficient, which are 
used as explanatory variables for the model 2, is significant and positive. The previous 
sentence implies that the bigger size has higher discretionary accounting accruals. 
Furthermore, the model 2 shows us that the ROA variable has a significant and positive 
coefficient. This concludes that the higher the earnings management is the higher the 
Greek firms have profitability. For concluding, we notice that the DS, BIG4, and LEV 
variables are not important to the influence of the DACCR variable, specifying that the 
cooperation with the big four audit firms, the growth and as well as leverage do not 
influence the accounting accruals. 
We see from the Table 5 that, the FAMILY and MANAGER, the two of the main 
independent variables have statistically significant coefficients, with the FAM negative 
and the MANAGER positive, which is similar to the model 2. In contrast, the two, 
FAMILY2 and DACCR, variables have a positive and significant association. It is 
important to say that because of the opposite value of the coefficient of FAMILY and 
FAMILY2, amongst the abnormal accounting accruals and the family ownership there is 
a U shape association with the inflection point of 35.51 % ( 0—0,181244 + 
2*0,259191F ~ F=0.3551). The lower value of the abnormal accounting accruals is 
when family ownership is 35.51 %. The lower the earnings quality the higher the 
abnormal accounting accruals. Additionally, the findings indicate that family ownership 
up to 71.02% (0.181/0.255=71.02%) family-owned firms report less abnormal 
accounting accruals than non-family. With different words, companies having a value 
of family ownership more than 71.02% presents more abnormal accruals than the 
others. This outcome corroborates our family U-shape effect hypothesis (Hypothesis 
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3) which suggests that family ownership and firm performance have a U-shape 
relation. Also, the BIG 4 and the LEV variables have significant and negative, while the 
ROA variable has a significant but positive coefficient. Therefore, when the leverage 
value would be increased prevent the managers from changing the reported earnings 
for avoiding the failure according to Jelinek and also an increased value of the Big 4 
auditor contracts decrease the earnings management. At the end, model 2 give the 
outcome that the profitability influence the discretionary accruals manipulation in a 
negative way, the higher the first the higher the second. 
4.3. Ensuring our results 
 
 For the purpose of improving our research, confirming the strength of our 
results, we make some sensitivity tests. This sensitivity test examines the deviations of 
the results. These deviations are very high numbers (observations), founding them in 
the DS, ASSETS and PPE variables. Furthermore, using the winserization technique for 
detecting the strength of our results, we see that, except the mean, these observations 
are express more than 3 st. deviations. From the mean, we took values that are equally 
with 3 st. Deviations and put them instead of the value of these high numbers. 
Although the findings are not represented in this paper, are very close to the results, 
which we see in Table 4 and 5. 
The previous sensitivity research specifies that the results of this analysis, are 
strong having to examine, except of the high number effect (deviations), the 
dissimilarity of the requirements of the relationship amongst earnings management 
with managerial ownership and with the family ownership. 
Finally, the excellence of the financial statements is influenced much by the 
audit. All the companies that we used are from the Athens Stock Exchange, there only 
the percentage of 14% are audited by the Big 4 audit firms. After using, to testing the 
impact of the audit companies on the results, the dummy variable BIG4, which we 
have seen in the previous chapters, we see a non-significant correlation coefficient. So, 
based on the abnormal accruals method, this kind of firms does not influence the 
results. 
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5. Conclusions 
 The purpose of this research is to explore how the founding of family 
ownership can potentially have an influence on earnings quality. We came to realize 
that managers can either make a change on accounting earnings, in order to boost the 
value of a firm, or they can manipulate the earnings for private profit at the expense of 
other shareholders. Today, several theories claim that founding family ownership can 
have an influence on the demand and the supply of earnings quality in two opponent 
ways: the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect. The entrenchment effect 
anticipates that founding families confiscate wealth from other investors by supplying 
lower earnings quality. Although, the supply of lower earnings quality, can be 
attenuated by the request for higher earnings quality if users of financial statements 
realize that family firms obtain corporate governance. On the other side, the alignment 
effect predicts that founding family ownership adjusts the interests of founding 
families with those of the different investors and therefore it’s associated with higher-
quality earnings. Nevertheless, if users of financial statements take for a given that 
family firms have better corporate governance, the supply of higher earnings quality 
might be mitigated by the lower demand for higher earnings quality. 
In order to confirm this theory, we chose 81 listed family-owned companies in 
Greece from 2011 to 2016 (324 observations) and we made an effort to share the 
ownership structure of these companies in two types: family ownership and 
managerial ownership. In addition to that, we evaluated earnings management using 
the discretionary accruals strategy. We also added the variable FAMILY2 to verify if 
there is a U-shape relation. The results indicate that higher earnings quality is 
connected to the family ownership structure of these companies. These results are 
consistent either with the entrenchment approach either with the alignment 
approach. 
Our research shows that family ownership and managerial ownership inflame 
actions of earnings management. Consequently, this outcome is related to hypothesis 
of the entrenchment approach, which proposes that the families have the appropriate 
motivation and the ability to manipulate earnings for achieving their own purpose, or 
with the hypothesis of the entrenchment approach, which proposes that managers 
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who obtain an important amount of a firms’ shares are more motivated to control and 
change the reported earnings. Moreover, our research indicates that the earnings 
management are less either if there is a high leverage in a company or if there is an 
engagement of a Big 4 auditor and then the earnings management are higher (when a 
firm’s profitability is high). 
Generally, our results indicate that, for the limitation of the possibility of the 
use of earnings management, the Greek family-owned listed companies are not 
efficient. Additionally, a large amount of the listed companies in Greece have family 
ownership and as well the management positions are taken from the controlling 
family. This fact maybe challenges them to manipulate the earnings that they report.  
On the whole, the results of our research are possible to donate to the 
presented literature about the managerial and family ownership composition and the 
earnings quality. Furthermore, amongst managerial ownership structure and earnings 
management, there is a positive association (Warfield Waand Wild [1995]). The latest 
studies from Wong and Fan (2002) and Klein (2002), have represented the associations 
amongst many different corporate governance methods and financial reporting. 
Consequently, our findings give pieces of information about the family and managerial 
ownership of earnings management, which is something that could provide benefit to 
shareholders and investors. In the end, this study concentrates much on the family 
ownership, a common effect around the world and in Greece, too. 
Nevertheless, this study has many severe limitations. First of all, one limitation 
of this study is the size, which is a bit smaller from the perfect. The result from the 
financial crisis in all over the world the last 7 years, lots of firms are out from the stock 
exchange market from 2011 to 2016 the period that we investigate or their shares are 
under investigation. Firms that have their shares under investigation are Companies 
whose shares are under suspicion, are excluded. The second limitation of our research 
is the existence of variables that are very common in many studies. Nevertheless, 
there are more variables that would be worth for examining because influence the 
ownership. Third, when the earnings quality is in high levels, it is uncertain if it is an 
outcome from the request for high earnings management from family-owned 
companies or from the supply of high earnings management by family-owned 
companies. Sadly, it is very difficult to recognize and divide this two cases in our 
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research. This limitation with our results is a basis to extend the examination. Next 
investigations could be made the examination for more years and with bigger size of a 
sample.  
In the end, it is important telling that family businesses have some unique 
advantages. These are: 
•   In purpose of high profits, having as aim a place in the market and a focus on the 
customers. 
•   A High quality of the products for protecting the name of the controlling family. 
•   Improvement of the firms’ productivity and long-term investments, as resulted from 
the focused ownership. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable Definitions  
Variable  Definition  
ACC  Total accruals at year t, total accruals are earning before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows. 
DACCR  Value (absolute) of abnormal accruals at year t. 
CFt Operating cash flows at year t, scaled by average total 
assets. 
CFt −1 Operating cash flows at year t-1, scaled by average total 
assets. 
CFt +1 Operating cash flows at year t+1, scaled by average total 
assets. 
DCFt Dummy variable, 1 if the change in cash flow at year t is 
less than zero (CFt-CFt-1<0) and 0 otherwise. 
FAMILY  Proportion of founding family ownership at year t. 
MANAG  Insider ownership, calculated via the proportion of total 
common equity owned by managers. 
DSt  The difference in sales from year t-1 to t.               
ASSETSt  Natural log of total assets at t. 
LEV  Firms’ leverage at year t, calculated via total liabilities 
divided by total assets. 
ROA  Net income at year t divided by average total assets at 
year t. 
PPEt Gross property, plant , and equipment; 
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LOSSt Dummy variable: 0 if net income > 0, 1 otherwise. 
BIG4  Dummy variable: 0 if the auditor is not from the BIG4 
firms, 1 otherwise. 
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